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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred by Dismissing a Portion of Mr. Clapp 's First Cause ofAction
on a Basis Not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First
Giving Him Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis.
Mr. Clapp's first cause of action was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

properly investigate and obtain evidence in mitigation of the crime, "to wit: mental health
treatment records from Nampa Medical Clinic, and an updated mental health evaluation that
complied with the requirements ofldaho Code 19-2524." R 201. The state argues on appeal that
The record demonstrates that the state requested dismissal of lack of sufficient
supporting evidence and because the claim was disproven by the underlying
record. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the claim because it was
disproved by the underlying record.
Respondent's Brief, pg. 5. However, that is not the case. In fact, the state's specific argument
was that this claim should be dismissed because "the Defendant had a Mental Health Evaluation
performed a year earlier.... The Defendant acknowledged this and states that use of the prior
Mental Health Evaluation was appropriate." R 230-1. That is a waiver argument, i.e., that Mr.
Clapp could not complain about counsel's failure to obtain both existing medical records and a
new mental health evaluation because he agreed the prior mental health evaluation was adequate.
While the trial court dismissed the portion of the claim dealing with failure to request an updated
mental health evaluation on the same basis as argued by the state, 1 it dismissed the second
portion of the claim on a different basis: "In addition, Mr. Clapp informed the court that he had
been suffering from depression and that he had been treated for it. Therefore, the court had the

The court wrote: "Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an updated
mental health evaluation because both trial counsel and Mr. Clapp told the court one was not
necessary. R 280.
1

1

information which the Nampa Medical records showed at the time of sentencing." R 280. This
is a conclusion that counsel's alleged deficient performance was not prejudicial under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because the court was told about the information in the

medical records. That is not the argument made by the state.
It follows from the above that Mr. Clapp was entitled to twenty-days notice of the court's

intent to dismiss on a basis other than that argued by the state as required by LC. § 19-4906(b).
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If the state's motion fails to give

such notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if the court
first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to dismiss and the ground
therefore pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b)."); see also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,523,236 P.3d
1277, 1283 (2010); see also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859,865,243 P.3d 675,681 (Ct. App.
2010). Further, the court's reason for dismissal of the medical records claim (lack of prejudice)
is "different in kind" from the state's argument (waiver). Thus, the dismissal of the portion of
the first cause of action which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain
medical records should be vacated.
While the state argues that a "remand in this case would accomplish nothing,"
Respondent's Brief, pg. 6, that conclusion is not supported by the record. The attached reports
from the Nampa Medical Clinic include evidence not considered by the court when imposing the
suspended sentence. While the court knew that "he was under treatment for his depression and
that he was making significant strides in reducing his alcohol consumption," R 280, the medical
records would have made a difference because they showed that at the time of the probation
violation Mr. Clapp was likely suffering from "major depression," a serious mental illness which
2

suggested Mr. Clapp's "functionality is impaired." R 43. Thus, while the records confirm what
the sentencing court was aware of, they add to that knowledge. They also would have permitted
counsel to argue that Mr. Clapp's depression was so severe that it caused the loss of functionality
in his day-to-day life which in turn lead to his relapse, but that the imposition of the sentence was
not appropriate because his depression could be treated in the community. Remand is required.
Next, the state argues that the dismissal of the first cause of action can be affirmed on the
alternative ground that "there is no reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment guarantees of
effective counsel apply in this case," Respondent's Brief, pg. 7, n. 3, as the right to counsel in
probation revocation proceedings arise out of the due process clause per Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973). In making this argument, the state argues that the Idaho Supreme Court
was "wrong" in stating that there was a Sixth Amendment right in State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278,
282, 833 P.2d. 911,915,915 (1992), but it does not ask this Court to reconsider that statement.
It also fails to mention, much less ask this Court to overrule State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376,
957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A defendant's right to counsel includes legal representation
during probation violation proceedings.") or State v. Lindsey, 124 Idaho 825, 864 P.2d 663 (Ct.
App. 1993). The Court of Appeals stated in Lindsey that "Our Supreme Court has held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to be represented by retained counsel at a
probation revocation proceedings, and that the right to appointed counsel conferred by LC. § 19852, therefore, also extends to probation revocation proceedings." 124 Idaho at 828, 864 P.2d at
666. The Court went on to note that "under the Idaho Supreme Court decision in State v. Young,
the case-by-case approach to the right to appointed counsel in probation violation hearing defined
by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli . .. is inapplicable in Idaho." Id., n.
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1 (first set of italics added).
Whether Young's reliance on the Sixth Amendment is right or "wrong," the Court held
that the right to appointed counsel in probation violation hearings in Idaho was the equivalent to
the Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel. Thus, the state's argument is precisely
backwards. There is every reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment requirement that

.

appointed counsel be effective counsel applies whether the legal basis for the original
appointment is statutory, the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteen Amendment. Douglas v.

California, 372 U.S. 353,357 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to counsel during the first appeal of right); Evitt v. Lucey, 489 U.S.
387, 396-397 (1985) (The right to counsel established by Douglas also guarantees the right to
effective assistance of counsel); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (Strickland v.

Washington standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to
raise a merits brief); see State v. Galaviz, 291 P.3d 62, 68 (Kan. 2012) ("[A] Kansas criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a probation revocation
proceeding under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.").
The state's alternative argument is without merit and this Court should vacate that portion
of the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
B.

The District Court Erred by Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth Cause ofAction on a Basis
Not Raised in the State's Motion/or Summary Disposition Without First Giving Him
Twenty-days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis.
Mr. Clapp' s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was based upon counsel's

failure to raise a challenge to the district court's use of unreliable hearsay at the probation
4

violation dispositional hearing. R 205. Mr. Clapp argues that the court erred in dismissing this
claim on a basis not raised by the state. In response, the state wrote that "[t]he difference Clapp
claims to see in the grounds for the motion and the grounds for the order are entirely figments of
imagination." Respondent's Brief, pg. 10. The record, however, provides tangible proof that the
court dismissed on grounds different from those argued by the state.
The state argued the following regarding the fifth cause of action:
As noted above, State v. Martinez[, 154 Idaho 940,303 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2013),]
stands for the exact opposite of what the Petitioner alludes to. In State v.
Martinez, the Court in its holding states[:]
"In line with the considerable authority, we decline to find that defendant's
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause
extends to sentencing proceedings. As such, Martinez has not shown that the
district court erred by considering the statement of a co-defendant whom she had
not had the opportunity to confront."

Id., at 949. This allegation fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding either deficient performance or resulting prejudice.
R 233-234. Thus, the record shows that the state moved for summary disposition arguing that
the claim should be dismissed because there is no right to confrontation at probation
dispositional hearings. R 233-34.
On the other hand, the court dismissed this claim writing that:
[I]t suffices to say once more that the state was entitled to argue conduct
underlying dismissed allegation and the Court was entitled to take this conduct
into account where it was supported by substantial evidence in the record. In this
case, the Court found the allegations by the defendant's probation officer in her
report of violation to be credible and substantial evidence regarding the conduct in
general, and therefore was entitled to refer to the evidence for purposes of
determining whether to revoke probation and impose sentence. Moreover, given
the defendant's criminal history and chronic abuse of alcohol, and his admitted
violation of probation by drinking on a number of occasions, this Court would
have been justified in revoking probation even had no discussion of the conduct
5

underlying the dismissed allegations occurred. There is no genuine dispute
regarding the prejudice arm of Strickland test, hence these claims must be
dismissed.
R 284-285 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the record shows that the court dismissed the claim
because it found no deficient performance (because there was no due process violation) and no
prejudice (because the court could have revoked probation without the disputed information). It
did not dismiss for the reason argued by the state, i.e., there is no right to confrontation at
sentencing proceedings. The state's argument that.Mr. Clapp is making this distinction up is
without factual basis.
Therefore, the dismissal of this cause of action should be vacated because the court failed
to give Mr. Clapp the twenty days notice required under LC.§ 19-4906(b) and Buss v. State,
supra.
C.

In the Alternative, the District Court Also Erred in Dismissing Mr. Clapp's Fifth
Cause ofAction on the Merits of the Claim. Mr. Clapp Presented a Prima Facie Case
That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Claim That the
Evidence That Mr. Clapp Was Driving Was Not Sufficiently Reliable to Be Considered.
The state argues that the dismissal on the merits of the claim was proper for two reasons.

First, "Clapp has failed to show any Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal from probation
violation proceedings" and second he "failed to present a viable claim that right was violated."
Respondent's Brief, pg. 10. Neither reason is correct.
As argued above, under State v. Young and its progeny there is a right to counsel at
probation violation hearing and there is the right to appointed counsel on appeal from such a
hearing. LC. § 19-852(2)(b). There is also the right to directly appeal an order revoking
probation and imposing sentence. I.A.R. 1 l(c)(6). Consequently, such an appeal is a "first
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appeal as of right" for purposes of Douglas v. California, Evitt v. Lucey and Smith v. Robbins,
and the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to that appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Patton, 934 N.E. 236,247 (Mass. 2010) (Trial counsel's failure to file a timely appeal from an
order revoking probation was ineffective.)

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), cited by the state, is not apposite because in Idaho
an appeal from an order revoking probation and imposing sentence is not a discretionary appeal.

It is an appeal as of right. I.A.R. 1 l(c)(6). In Ross, the defendant had an appeal to the state
intermediate appeal court and the Supreme Court held he did not have the right to counsel in
order to see discretionary review in the State Supreme Court. 417 U.S., at 610.
Further, appellate counsel could have raised the due process issue on appeal
notwithstanding the lack of objection by trial counsel at the revocation proceeding. Mr. Clapp
had previously objected to the use of the disputed information by the court in setting bond.
Counsel told the court that in regards to Mr. Clapp driving his father's truck "my client denies
them adamantly" and while "his probation officer clearly thought he was driving or indicated that
he admitted to driving, Tyler says that is not true." R 100 (T pg. 22, In. 10-18). Thus the court
was aware that Mr. Clapp denied the allegation and there was no opportunity to object after the
court stated Mr. Clapp's alleged driving was used to revoke his probation and imposing sentence.
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Court held that an
unobjected-to error should cause a reversal when the defendant persuades the court that the error:
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or
obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226, 245
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P.3d at 978. Here the error (1) affected Mr. Clapp's unwaived right to be sentenced only upon
reliable information, (2) the error is clear from the record and (3) the court's reliance on the
erroneous information led the court to impose sentence. It is telling to note that the court only
said that it "would have been justified in revoking probation," but did not find that it would have
done so. R 285. In addition, the court clearly relied upon the driving allegations in denying Mr.
Clapp's post-revocation I.C.R. 35 motion. ("Furthermore, Mr. Clapp has also shown that he is
not a good candidiate for supervision in the community-even while on probation for a drinking
related offense, Mr. Clapp continued to drink and to drive.") R 37. See State v. Velasco, 154
Idaho 534, 537, 300 P.3d 66, 69 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding that sentencing court's erroneous
consideration of competency evaluation at sentence required vacation of sentence even though
the defendant did not contemporaneously object).
Finally, the claim was meritorious. Mr. Clapp's argument in this regard is set forth at
pages 13-16 of the Opening Brief which will not be repeated in the interests of brevity but which
are incorporated herein by this reference. Had the due process claim been raised on appeal, the
order revoking probation would have been vacated. Thus, the failure to raise the issue on appeal
was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the court erred by summarily dismissing this
claim.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Mr. Clapp respectfully requests
that the order of summary disposition as to his first cause of action be vacated in part. He also
respectfully requests that the order of summary disposition as to his fifth cause of action be
vacated and the matter be remanded for further proceedings.
8

Respectfully submitted this~y of March, 2015.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Tyler Clapp
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